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The rules of the game on Wall Street may be ever changing but a professor of economics at 
Princeton University, Burton Malkiel, has held on to his views on how the game should be played 
for almost four decades. 
In the latest edition of his 1973 book, A Random Walk Down Wall Street, financial innovations, 
such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETF), money market funds, equity real estate investment 
trusts (REIT), asset-backed securities, as well as new trading techniques such as portfolio 
insurance and flash trading, are discussed. 
Updating his data sets to include lessons from the Internet bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, 
Malkiel validated his fundamental thesis of diversification through investments in indexes. 
He also drew on the insights of behavioural finance, and finished the book with strategies for 
investors, examining how where they are in their life-cycles matter, offering practical measures 
for them to safeguard and to grow their assets. 
In the first part of his book, Malkiel walks the reader through the major financial bubbles that all 
ultimately had the same ending -wealth destruction for its participants. 
Be it the tulip mania of the 16th century, the South Sea bubble which imploded in the 18th, or the 
more recent episodes of the soaring “New Era” sixties, the Nifty Fifty, the Japan real estate and 
stock market boom (and bust), or the Internet and the US housing bubble over the last decade – 
they were all built like castles in the air. 
Otherwise known as the “greater fool” theory, investors buy into an asset with the expectation 
that someone down the line will be willing to pay even more for it. Such departure from the “firm 
foundation” of the intrinsic value of the assets leads to a market correction. 
“The market eventually corrects any irrationality – albeit in its own slow, inexorable fashion. 
Anomalies can crop up, markets can get irrationally optimistic, and often, they attract unwary 
investors. But eventually, true value is recognised by the market, and this is the main lesson 
investors must heed,” Malkiel explained. 
Malkiel believed that the efficient market eventually prevails. He used the “random walk” analogy, 
which draws on the idea of a drunken sailor staggering around in an open space. The trajectory 
of his next steps cannot be predicted, and where he ends up after many such random steps is 
unknown. Malkiel postulated that short-run changes in stock prices are no different from the 
random walk of the drunken sailor. 
Naturally, market professionals take umbrage at the audacity of such a suggestion that market 
movements are random and unpredictable, expounding the merits of fundamental and technical 
analysis techniques in predicting the direction of the prices of financial assets. Malkiel spends the 
second part of his book critiquing these techniques. 
Refuting the charts 
Technical analysis is the study of charts in the belief that all information, be it earnings, dividends 
or future performance, is all reflected in the past performance of the prices. Fundamental 
analysis takes a different approach.  It attempts to determine a stock’s proper value by studying 
the assets and growth rate of the company, along with interest rates and risks. If the number they 
arrive at is above the market price, this indicates that they should buy. 
Malkiel attacks the logic of each technical analysis method and shows why the charts’ seemingly 
repetitive patterns are a statistical illusion. 
He got his students at Princeton University to create charts of a hypothetical stock by flipping 
coins. If the toss was a head, the stock moved up half a point, and if it was a tail, it moved down 
half a point. 
Continuing this process over a large number of flips, they produced a chart that resembled a 
“normal” stock price chart, with pronounced up and down cycles. Some even exhibit the head 
and shoulders formation, triple tops and bottoms and other chart Patterns that often mean 
something to the technicians. 
Malkiel then showed a technician one of the more bullish patterns, which got him really excited, 
with the technician calling for an immediate buy. Imagine the technician’s reaction when Malkiel 
told him that the chart was made up purely from random coin flips. 
Malkiel wrote, “When events sometimes do come in clusters and streaks, people look for 
explanations and patterns. They refuse to believe that they are random, even though such 
clusters and streaks do occur frequently in random data such as are derived from a tossing of a 
coin. So it is in the stock market as well.” 
As for fundamental analysis, Malkiel suggested that clairvoyance is required to be able to 
forecast future earnings. Random events often put a spanner in their detailed calculations, while 
“creative” accounting procedures can create dubious earnings reports. Conflict of interests might 
arise from firms with investment banking operations that do not want to jeopardise client 
relationships with a negative report. 
Analysts also make unforced errors, while the best of them tend to be lost to the more lucrative 
sales or portfolio management departments. 
Even if the analysts foul up their earnings forecast, do the professionals make their customers 
money? Examining the track records of mutual funds, Malkiel concluded that the answer is a 
resounding no. 
Mutual funds, on the average, lose to their benchmarks. Even occasional superior performances 
of managers are inconsistent, leaving investors no way to predict which fund might outperform. 
Malkiel cited an academic study that suggested that market timers would have to make correct 
decisions 70 per cent of the time to beat buy-and-hold investors. Portfolio managers on average 
fail to time the market correctly, holding the most cash in their allocations at market bottoms, and 
the least at market peaks. 
Practical Steps For The Walk 
The third part of the book is the centre of Malkiel’s treatise, containing the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) and the modern portfolio theory (MPT). 
He explained that the EMH states that the structure of market prices already takes into account 
any public information that may be contained in financial statements and reflect prevailing news 
and expectations. Because the market is so good at adjusting to new information, fundamental 
and technical analysis is, according to him, as useful as a random walk. 
As for MPT, diversification in a “market portfolio” will lower the overall risk because of the 
imperfect correlation between the various assets, implying that higher returns can only come 
about as a result of higher risks. 
While the first three parts of his book create a foundation to make sense of his recommended 
investment strategies, Malkiel steps through a series of practical measures in his conclusion 
section, such as the importance of saving (start as soon or as young as possible), of having 
some cash reserve and insurance (he favours buying term insurance and investing the rest), 
being tax efficient, but most importantly, to understand your own investment objectives and risk 
tolerance. 
Malkiel also highlighted that asset allocation decisions accounted for 90 per cent of an investor’s 
total returns. He does recommend that common stocks make up a sizeable chunk of an 
investor’s total portfolio, precisely how sizeable depending on the investor’s age and risk 
tolerance, since the risk of investing in stocks decrease the longer it is held. 
While his recommended mode of participating in stocks is through internationally diversified 
index funds, he does have some pointers for those wishing to stock pick. He suggested that most 
of the portfolio should be in core holdings comprising the index funds, with a small allocation to 
the stock picks. 
He noted that it would require a lot of work, but for those game enough to do it, to confine their 
purchases to companies that are able to sustain above average earnings growth, to never pay 
more than what firm foundation values suggest, to buy stocks that have castle in the air type of 
stories, and to trade as little as possible. 
Perhaps the one important idea embedded in his book that can serve both as an encouragement 
and a warning: “If you want a get-rich-quick investment strategy, this is not the book for you. I’ll 
leave that for the snake oil salesmen. You can only get poor quickly. To get rich, you will have to 
do it slowly, and you have to start now.” 
 
